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Abstract. When making important decisions such as choosing health insur-
ance or a school, people are often uncertain what levels of attributes will suit
their true preference. After choice, they might realize that their uncertainty
resulted in a mismatch: choosing a sub-optimal alternative, while another
available alternative better matches their needs.
We study here the overall impact, from a central planner’s perspective,
of decisions under such uncertainty. We use the representation of Voronoi
tessellations to locate all individuals and alternatives in an attribute space.
We provide an expression for the probability of correct match, and calculate,
analytically and numerically, the average percentage of matches. We test de-
pendence on the level of uncertainty and location.
We find overall considerable mismatch even for low uncertainty - a possible
concern for policy makers. We further explore a commonly used practice -
allocating service representatives to assist individuals’ decisions. We show
that within a given budget and uncertainty level, the effective allocation is for
individuals who are close to the boundary between several Voronoi cells, but
are not right on the boundary.
Introduction
Important decisions people make, such as choosing health insurance, or choosing
a school, require complex considerations. In many cases these considerations are
further complicated by the uncertainty, or error of individuals in understanding
what levels of specific attributes match their true preferences. For instance, in
choosing a school, people might find it hard to specify what a ”good” school means
to them in terms of the level of specific attributes such as the number of Math
hours, intensiveness of the music program, vocational training, geographic location,
or whether the athletics program should include Quidditch (Jenkin 2015) [1]. After
their children start attending the school, they might realize that they find the Math
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2 MODELLING ALLOCATION MATCH UNDER UNCERTAINTY
program less demanding, the music program too intensive, or that a 20 minute
walk to school is more strenuous than they expected. Thus, they would have been
happier with a school that has slightly different values on these attributes. Such
patterns of post choice evaluation, regret, and disappointment have been empirically
documented in the past literature (e.g. Westbrook 1987 [2]; Inman, Dyer and Jia
1997 [3]). Representing the relevant domain in the attribute space we say that while
individuals might claim to know where their preferences are located in the space,
there is often uncertainty as to their true desired location. Only after the choice,
they might realize that their perceived location doesn’t match their true needs and
desires. This uncertainty might be a result of insufficient information about the
meaning of different levels of attributes for them (e.g. what parental involvement,
or an intensive music program require from them), or misconception as to what
they really want.
In a market with several alternatives, such uncertainty might result in a mis-
match - that is, choosing an alternative that is sub-optimal, although there are
other available alternatives which better match one’s real needs. For example,
while parents might be certain that they want the school with the intensive Math
program, they might have actually been better off in a school with a less intensive
program. Therefore their true preference would be in a slightly different location
in the attribute space than what they initially thought they were. The choice lit-
erature indicates that mismatches happen when the choice task is complicated, or
when individuals do not have enough previous experience with the specific choice
task (Mosteller and Nogee 1951) [4]
Considerable effort is invested in reducing uncertainty to avoid mismatch in
important decisions. Financial planners are used to consult in choosing health
plans (McClanahan 2014) [5], and advisors assist in pension plan choice (PFau
2016) [6]. Residents of major cities such as New York City employ expensive private
consultants to assist in choosing a school (Harris and Fessenden 2017) [7]. From the
perspective of the central planner that provides and supervises these services, too
many mismatches are undesirable. A large group of dissatisfied service recipients
might cause a decrease in the overall social welfare, which, in turn might lead to
social and economic consequences. Assuming that the central planner wants to
maximize the social welfare, as a goal by itself or in order to serve political and
economic stability, it would better to minimize mismatches.
Our goal in this paper is to study the overall impact, from the perspective of the
central planner, of decisions under the uncertainty described above (which we term
hereafter as ”uncertainty in preferences”). Similar to the school choice problem
(Holmes Erickson 2017 [8]; Abdulkadiroglu et al. 2020 [9]), the decision scenarios
we model apply to high involvement, multiple attribute goods and services that
are monitored by a central planner. They can be credence/experience goods and
services, with a high importance for customer satisfaction and a high chance for
post-choice evaluation and regret. While some of their attributes (such as distance
or cost) might be very directional (a rational consumer will prefer zero distance
and zero cost), many other attributes (e.g. level of religiousness, intensity of the
math program, hours of French per week etc.) are a matter of personal preference
and can greatly vary between individuals. While the general formulation of the
problem can incorporate a large number of market conditions and variables, we
wish to work with a restrained set of conditions that will enable us to focus on the
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effect of uncertainty. Therefore, we focus on the case of no supply constraints, no
specific market structure, and no interactions between individuals. Our modeling
framework enables expansion to include these scenarios.
We use the representation of Voronoi tessellations to describe an attribute space
with different alternatives, each having its attraction basin. Individuals can be
also located in this space, according to their preference. Each individual has a
perceived location, but since individuals might not correctly estimate the attribute
levels that match their needs, this perceived location might be distant from their
true preference, up to a certain uncertainty factor. The uncertainty creates an error
in the perceived location of the individual, and hence can place the individual in
the attraction basin of another, sub-optimal alternative, causing a mismatch.
We focus on the probability of correct match - that is, when the choice made
is indeed the best alternative for this individual. We provide an expression for
the probability for correct match, and show how it depends on the location in the
attribute space and on the level of uncertainty. We give a formula for the average
percentage of matches for low uncertainty level and use numerical simulation to
extend the description for larger uncertainty.
We then extend our model by including a policy to help individuals obtain the
correct decision and avoid mismatches. In some cases the central planner might offer
”front-desk” services, which provide help through face-to-face or phone meetings.
Such services are effective but costly. We use our model to study how the authority
can allocate service representatives to individuals within a given budget in a way
that will maximize the overall level of match.
Our contribution is by studying decisions under uncertainty in prefer-
ences from the perspective of the central planner. We draw inspiration from two
streams of literature: Decisions under uncertainty, and Matching theory. Decisions
under uncertainty have been mostly modeled from the individual’s point of view,
and focused on the information search of individuals (Branco, Sun and Villas-Boas
2012) [10], on how they sample the choice alternatives (Chick and Frazier 2012) [11],
how they use social influence to compensate for the missing information (Lopez-
Pintado and Watts 2009)[12], and how they update their preferences based on each
additional information bit they receive (Erdem and Keane 1996) [13]. These mod-
els often consider factors such as expected utility from each alternative and risk
aversion (Machina 1987) [14]. In choice modeling, random utility models were used
to describe uncertainty in choice, under the assumption that some attributes are
unobserved and are represented as random variables (e.g. Ben-Akiva and Lerman
1985 [15]), or, alternatively, that the decision-making individual considers each time
only a subset of the attributes (Becker, DeGroot, and Marschak 1951 [16]). Works
on post-choice evaluation (e.g. Inman, Dyer and Jia 1997) [3] emphasized factors
such as satisfaction and regret. This body of literature focuses on uncertainty in
one’s understanding of the true value of the suggested alternatives, or, as in the
random utility models, that the entire attribute space is not taken into account
during the choice. Our focus is on an attribute space and a set of alternatives that
are entirely known to the individual, and the uncertainty in one’s understanding of
his/her own needs and wants.
The implications of choice from the central planner’s perspective have mostly
been studied without relating to uncertainty. Studies in matching theory (Gale
and Shapley 1961 [17]; Roth 1986 [18]) suggest algorithms for matching between
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individuals and outlets in various scenarios (schools, houses, hospital residency (see
So¨nmez and U¨nver (2011) [19] for review), where slots are limited, requiring one
of the sides or both, to rank their mutual preferences. Recent works on matching
have begun to incorporate uncertainty in various forms: Ehlers and Mass (2015)
[20] describe a matching game where players are not sure about the preferences of
other players. Hazon et al. (2012) [21] study forecasting voting patterns, where
the ranking of candidates for each voter is not fully known to an outside observer.
Aziz et al. (2020) [22] study the case where the individuals themselves are not
certain in their rankings, but rather rank their preferences with a probability smaller
than 1. These models are usually characterized by: (1) assuming limited capacity
(otherwise all individuals get what they want); and (2) not having a direct access
to the attributes, but rather to a rank ordering of alternatives. Their focus is to
find the best matching algorithm that will create stable equilibrium.
Our modeling perspective draws from both streams - similar to the matching
models we deal with matching alternatives to individuals, from the perspective of
a central planner. Similar to the decision-under-uncertainty problems, our model
deals directly with the attributes and does not use ranking of alternatives. How-
ever, we do not focus on the individual level, but rather look at the entire set of
alternatives and individuals. We do not assume capacity constraints since, in the
presence of uncertainty, mismatches can occur even without capacity limitations.
Our focus is not empirical estimation, or efficient matching algorithm but rather
to measure the probability for correct match and its dependence on various market
factors. To the best of our knowledge, this work is the first to suggest a measure
for the overall probability of matches, and calculate analytically its average value.
Our model enables studying specific policies for minimizing the mismatch, such as
the use of service representatives.
The space of attributes and Voronoi tessellations
Our goal is to calculate the overall impact, from the perspective of the central
planner, of decisions under uncertainty in preferences. To do so, we want to de-
fine a measure for the probability of a correct match for every possible individual
preference, and then calculate its average value over a population. As explained
above, most matching algorithms (So¨nmez and U¨nver (2011) [19] assume limited
capacity, and the criterion for the optimal overall match is a stable equilibrium
that is, there is no pair of individuals who would be better-off by switching the
alternatives they were assigned with. Therefore, these algorithms do not provide a
continuous metric for the probability of a correct match. Individual level decision
models that incorporated uncertainty (Erdem and Keane 1996 [13]; Ben-Akiva and
Lerman 1985 [15]) were used more for empirically estimating one’s utility and rarely
provide an overall view of all the individuals and alternatives. The representation
we seek is one that considers the entire attribute space and range of alternatives,
allows representation of the alternatives as well as the individuals, provides a con-
tinuous measure of the match probability as a function of uncertainty, and can be
easily expanded to incorporate cases of interventions of the central planner, changes
in the alternatives, and population changes.
To do so, we define a space A of attributes. Each dimension in this space is
a numerical representation of a single attribute in the relevant context (e.g. level
of religiousness, level of parental involvement, geographic location of the school).
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The space is a K dimensional box with boundaries, representing the range of each
attribute.
In this space we place J alternatives, (such as the various schools) giving to
each alternative a point Pj in this K-dimensional space.The location of an alter-
native represents its performance on each of the attributes. Each alternative has
its attraction basin, and these partition the space of attributes A into a Voronoi
tessellation (Obake and Suzuki 1997 [23]; De Leeuw 2005 [24]).
The construction divides the space of attributes into Voronoi cells, which are the
basins of attraction:
Dj = {x ∈ A : dist(x, Pj) ≤ dist(x, Pk), ∀k = 1, . . . , J}.
These are convex polyhedra, with disjoint interiors, whose union is all of A, see
Figure 1a.
Individuals (say, the students, or their parents) are represented as points in
the attribute space A. The location of an individual i in this space, denoted by
x, represents the true desire, or the ”ideal” product of the individual (that is, a
hypothetical alternative which should maximize individual i’s utility). It reflects
both the desired level of attributes, as well as the importance of the attribute to
the individual. We want to match individuals to the alternative which most closely
matches their preferences. A closest match would be an alternative Pj so that the
distance between the individual’s location x ∈ A is not greater than the distance to
any other product, i.e., that resides within the same Voronoi cell. In utility terms,
one can say that the utility derived from each actual alternative j can be represented
as a function of the proximity of individual i to the location of alternative j.
We assume that the location of the alternatives in space is known to the indi-
viduals and is also known to the central planner. This is a reasonable assumption
since consumers these days have wide access, through social media, customer re-
views, and other online resources to the specifications of the alternatives in their
choice set (Bronnenberg, Kim and Mela 2016[25]).
Modeling uncertainty. We add uncertainty to this representation: individuals,
being sure they know what they want, locate themselves in a perceived place, which
is distant from their true location in the attribute space up to an uncertainty factor
ρ.
A common distinction is made in literature between uncertainty which assumes
the probability of each alternative is known, and ambiguity where the individual
also needs to assess the probability distribution from which the alternatives are
drawn (Kahn and Sarin 1988) [26]. In this paper we do not deal with ambigu-
ity. We assume that all alternatives are available and their properties are known.
We describe uncertainty in the desired level of attributes, that is, uncertainty in
preferences, and not in product location, product performance, or influence of un-
controlled factors.
Our setup has appeared in Computer Science, in the ”nearest-neighbor search
problem”, which returns the nearest neighbor of a query point x in a set of points
P in Rd. Both the data (the set of points P) and the query (the point x) may be
uncertain. For instance (see Beskales et al. 2008 [27]), in location-based services,
a user may request the locations of the nearest gas stations. To protect the user’s
privacy, an area that encloses the user’s actual location may be used as the query
object, while gas stations (the data objects P) have deterministic locations. In
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contrast to our goals, this literature focused on algorithmic and complexity aspects
of the problem, see for instance the recent paper by Agrawal (2006) [28] and the
references there.
Due to the uncertainty ρ, an individual with a true location x, has a perceived
location at a point around x. The perceived location is a point randomly drawn
from a uniformly distributed ball of radius ρ around the true location x. Note that
neither the individual nor the central planner know the true location x. All they
know is the perceived location. Even if individuals are aware of the uncertainty
ρ, they can not reconstruct the drawing process. The uniformity assumption is
required for the convenience of the formal analysis, and makes sense for a finite
space and for the general case, where we assume zero information on the preferences.
Thus, rather than a point in the space of attributes, we actually have a ball
B(x, ρ) of all points at distance at most ρ which define a possible perceived location
of the individual whose true location is x. By taking the shape of a ball, we assume
that the uncertainty is equal in all dimensions. This is a reasonable assumption for
a general space, with no specific information on the dimension. However, even if
the uncertainty is not equal in all dimensions, the uncertainty ball can be regarded
as the circumscribed ball where ρ is the uncertainty in the dimension with the
maximal uncertainty.
Note, that while the uncertainty ball is uniform across attributes, and has a
single radius for the entire population, the random draw of the perceived location
generates heterogeneity across individuals: the perceived location is drawn for each
and every individual separately, and therefore the actual error, namely, the dis-
tance between the perceived location and the true location varies across individuals
and across attributes. The uncertainty ρ can therefore be regarded as the maximum
possible error in the perception.
The point x usually lies in a unique Voronoi cell Dj which gives the correct
match, while the ball B(x, ρ) may intersect with some other cells.The probability
Pρ(x) that the individual whose true location is the point x is assigned to the
correct Voronoi cell to which it belongs (that is, the cases where the choice of the
individual is indeed optimal) is the relative area (or volume) of the ball which lies
in that cell, see Figure 1b:
(1) Pρ(x) =
vol(Dj ∩B(x, ρ))
volB(x, ρ)
.
As illustrated in Figure 1, Pρ(x) strongly depends on the distribution of prod-
ucts in the attribute space, on the distance from the cell boundaries, and on the
relationships between ρ and the location within the Voronoi cell.
The probability for correct match. From the perspective of the central planner
which provides and supervises the services, a key measure of interest would be the
effect of the uncertainty in individuals’ preferences on the overall mismatch for the
entire population. A key measure we calculate is the average probability of correct
match 〈Pρ〉:
(2) 〈Pρ〉 := 1
vol(A)
∫
A
Pρ(x)dx
that is the average of Pρ(x) over the entire attribute space - all the locations x,
and all the Voronoi cells Dj . We seek to describe its variation as we change the
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uncertainty factor ρ. For a uniformly distributed population in the attribute space
〈Pρ〉 is given by:
(3) 〈Pρ〉 = 1
vol(A)
∑
j
∫
Dj
vol (B(x, ρ) ∩Dj)
volB(x, ρ)
dx
where B(x, ρ) is the ball around x of radius ρ,and
∫
Dj
dx means integration within
a Voronoi cell j (see Supplementary Information Part 1 Proposition 1 for details).
To provide an intuition as to how to compute this integral, recall that for a
given individual in location x, when x is distanced more than ρ to the boundary,
a match will always be obtained. However, when x is closer to the boundary than
ρ, the probability for a mismatch grows. As illustrated in Figure 2a, for each
cell, there is only a finite danger zone, around its boundaries, where a mismatch
can occur. The cumulative area of the danger zones of all cells depends on two
factors: 1) the size of ρ, 2) the total length of the boundaries between cells (in a
general K dimensional space the danger zone will be the relevant volume, and the
length will be in dimension K − 1. In the one-dimensional case, where we only
have one attribute, and the boundary consists of isolated points, the ”length” of
the boundary will be the number of points). For example, in Figure 2a, describing
a two dimensional space, this factor will be the total length of all the internal
boundary segments between cells. When ρ = 0, clearly P0 ≡ 1 as there is no
uncertainty. When ρ  0 is sufficiently large so that the uncertainty ball exceeds
the combined size of the cells, the true location could be practically in any of the
cells, meaning that the uncertainty is so vast that for every individual all the options
seem reasonable to choose from.
Therefore, if ρ is small enough to disregard overlap of danger zones from different
cells, the volume of the total danger zone is approximately (to leading order) given
by ρ times the total area of the internal boundaries (∂intD). For the special case
of a single attribute (one dimensional space), the attribute space is an interval of
the size length(A), and the Voronoi cells are segments within this interval. The
boundaries are single points, so the total area of the boundaries is given directly
by the number of alternatives J . We give an analytic formula for 〈Pρ〉 for the
case of a small ρ (namely, ρ smaller or equal to half of the smallest segment (See
Supplementary Information Part 1 Proposition 2):
(4) 〈Pρ〉 = 1− J − 1
2
ρ
lengthA .
For higher dimensions K ≥ 2, we compute the match probability for the first
variation of 〈Pρ〉, that is for the slope at ρ = 0, which is the v in the expansion
〈Pρ〉 ∼ 1− vρ. The notation f(ρ) ∼ g(ρ) as ρ→ 0 means limρ→0 f(ρ)/g(ρ) = 1.
In dimension K ≥ 2, the mean probability for correct assignment 〈Pρ〉 for ρ
small is
(5) 〈Pρ〉 ∼ 1−
 cK
volA
∑
j
volK−1(∂intDj)
 · ρ, ρ↘ 0
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where
(6) cK =
1
2
Γ
(
K
2 + 1
)
√
piΓ
(
K+3
2
) =

1
pi
22m
(m+1)(2m+1m )
, K = 2m even
1
22m+2
(
2m+1
m
)
, K = 2m+ 1 odd.
Here, Γ is the Gamma function, thus c1 =
1
4 , c2 =
2
3pi , c3 =
3
16 , etc. See
Supplementary Information Part 1 Proposition 3 for the proof. When ρ is large,
we can no longer disregard the overlap of the different danger zones, and we rely
on numerical calculation of equation (3).
Note that in the special case of (K = 1), Eq (5) reduces to Eq (4) as 〈Pρ〉 =
1 − ( 14
∑
j #∂
intDj) · ρ, once we note that cK = 14 . The boundary of an interior
interval consists of 2 points, so that #∂intDj = 2 for the J − 2 interior intervals,
and #∂intDj = 1 for the two intervals at the boundary of the space - j = 1, and
j = J .
Eq (5) reveals the dominance of the cell boundaries on the match probability.
It predicts that as ρ increases, 〈Pρ〉 decreases linearly, with a slope that depends
strongly on the length of the boundaries between the different Voronoi cells.
To extend the above analysis for the all values of ρ we numerically calculate
〈Pρ〉 for the two dimensional case. We represent the market as a two dimensional
grid, with 6 alternatives located as shown in Figure 1 (the results are robust across
location choices). We then execute three steps: first we assign for each grid point the
best matched alternative. Second, we evaluate Pρ(x) by measuring the percentage
of points having the same alternative in a sphere of radius ρ. Finally, we average
Pρ(x) over the entire grid to obtain 〈Pρ〉.
Figure 2a shows Pρ(x) for the setting described in Figure 1, for ρ = 0.075. While
most of the attribute space enjoys a perfect probability for a match, near the bound-
aries the probability decreases. Panel b describes 〈Pρ〉 as a function of ρ for the
same market configuration, comparing the small ρ approximation to numerical cal-
culations. The slope of 〈Pρ〉 vs. ρ that is obtained from the approximation matches
precisely the result of the numerical simulation. Both analytical and numerical
calculations show that the probability for a correct match rapidly decreases with ρ.
While for the approximation, the decrease is linear, the numerical simulations show
that for large values of ρ, the decrease is attenuated, saturating at
∑J
j=1(volDj)
2.
To illustrate the implications of the mismatch think of the opening example of
choosing a school. In this setting, With ρ = 0.15, 20% of the population will be
dissatisfied, on average, with their choice, while there is another available school
which matches their needs.
Note, that the matching in the above analysis is binary, that is, a mismatch
happens when not assigning an individual with the true alternative, regardless of
how the assigned alternative is close to the individual in the attribute space (this
is an assumption in some of the literature on post-purchase evaluation e.g. Inman,
Dyer and Jia (1997) [3]). In the Supplementary Information Part 2, we explore our
results when the metric for the evaluation of the effect of uncertainty considers also
the distance to the various alternatives.
Dependence on the number and distribution of alternatives. The results shown in
Figure 2 provide an example for a specific configuration of six products. To assess
the generalizability of this example we examined the effect of the number and
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distribution of the alternatives on the match probability. The slope of 〈Pρ〉 where
ρ = 0 serves as a useful metric, since it can be calculated directly from the length
of boundaries. Higher slope indicates a stronger effect of the uncertainty on the
match probability. Increasing the number of alternatives increases the slope - when
more alternatives are available, the probability for a correct match decreases (see
Figure 3a). This might seem counter-intuitive, as one would expect that more
alternatives to choose from imply greater overall possibilities for a match. However,
at the same time, more options mean more probability for a mismatch - as an
individual is surrounded by more alternatives, he is less likely to choose the optimal
one . In our terminology, we say that the ball of uncertainty intercepts with a
larger number of Voronoi cells. Note, that there is a body of literature on the
relationship between the number of alternatives during choice process, and the
level of satisfaction and regret. Having more choice alternatives to choose from
often increases the difficulty of the task and reduces satisfaction (e.g. Schwartz
2003 [29]; Haynes 2009 [30]).
We further use the numerical simulations to explore how the distribution of the
alternatives in the attribute space affects the match probability. Assume the loca-
tion of the alternatives is drawn from a trimmed Gaussian distribution with width
σ. Figure 3b presents the slope −d 〈Pρ〉 /dρ
∣∣∣
ρ=0
vs. σ for a market with 6 alter-
natives. Increasing the width of the distribution increases the slope, thus reducing
the probability for a correct match. The limiting case of uniform distribution has
the lowest probability for a match (see Figure 3b). The intuition behind this is that
the more dense the alternatives are, they are more similar to each other, meaning
that the effective number of real alternatives is small, which, as illustrated in panel
a, implies a higher match probability.
Allocating service representatives. The results described above indicate that
under uncertainty in preferences, mismatches are very likely to occur and can affect
a considerable portion of the population, which creates a challenge for the central
planner. As explained above, the authorities often employ service representatives
(reps, hereafter), which assist individuals in understanding their true needs through
personal meetings. Thus, the central planner wishes to improve 〈Pρ〉 by introduc-
ing meetings with reps, which once having met with an individual, improve the
individual’s uncertainty from ρ to a lower value ρl < ρ. Same as with the original
uncertainty ball, our formulation practically allows heterogeneity in the amount of
improvement: after the meeting with the service rep, a new perceived location is
drawn, within a smaller radius ρl. The actual amount of improvement will naturally
vary for each individual and each dimension.
Due to budget constraints these reps meet only a fraction b of the total population
of individuals. We therefore ask who are the individuals which, within a given
budget, should receive assistance from a rep in a way that will maximize the number
of individuals who find their best matching alternative.
When the reps are allocated randomly, the new expected probability of correct
assignment is
(1− b) 〈Pρ〉+ b 〈Pρl〉
Therefore, if we fix ρl and ρ, and assuming that reps are randomly assigned to the
population, increasing the proportion b of reps results in a linear increase of the
expected probability of correct assignment.
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We now check whether the central planner can improve the effectiveness of the
reps by assigning them to specific individuals. To find the optimal assignment
of service reps we define the local increase in match probability obtained from
assigning a service rep to location x to be ∆(x, ρ, ρl) = Pρl(x) − Pρ(x). Next, we
choose bN grid points, where N is the total number of points on the grid, that have
the maximal value of ∆(x, ρ, ρl), and reduce the uncertainty at these points to be ρl.
Finally, to calculate the improvement in the match probability obtained from this
process, we average Pρ(x) over the entire grid. We note that this optimal allocation
scheme uses the true location x of each individual, since we want to find the optimal
allocation and spot the individuals who will have the maximum benefit from the
service reps. In practice, as we stated above, x is not known to the central planner,
and thus, the central planner’s implementation will be approximate, having its own
error. We do not deal with such implementation error, but rather find the allocation
which sets an upper limit to the benefit of the use of service reps.
Figure 4 describes the overall improvement in 〈Pρ〉 for various budget values
b, where a budget is measured as the overall proportion of available rep meetings
for the entire population. Panel a illustrates the areas which found to be optimal
for receiving a meeting with the rep, within a budget b = 0.2, for ρl = 0.05 and
ρ = 0.3. We see that the places for optimal allocation (in blue), are those that are
close to the boundaries between the Voronoi cells (white), but are not directly on
the boundaries. When the distance from the boundary is smaller than ρl, meeting
a rep will not significantly increase 〈Pρ〉. Panel b presents 〈Pρ〉 as a function of the
budget b. While with random allocation, the improvement is linear with the budget,
with the optimal allocation the curve shows a diminishing return and saturation
at b ≈ 0.7, meaning that the gain from allocating a service rep decreases as the
number of allocated reps increases.
To further demonstrate the effectiveness of service reps, we compare two ways
to increase the match probability: the first is allocation reps as discussed, and the
second is reducing the overall uncertainty of the population through means such as
educational or citizen involvement programs. Panel c shows, for each budget, what
is the uncertainty ρ that is equivalent to b percentage of the population meetings
with reps. A budget that allows meeting reps for 20% of the population increases
〈Pρ〉 from 0.8 to 0.88, which is equivalent to reducing ρ for the entire population
from 0.3 to 0.18. While in practice such a change in the entire population might
require long term educational and citizen involvement programs, the same result
could be obtained by providing a relatively simple, easy to operate, front-desk
service to a pre-targeted population.
Discussion
This paper deals with the overall impact of decisions, when individuals choose
between alternatives, but have uncertainty as to the level of attributes that match
their preferences.
We add to previous literature by suggesting a continuous measure for the prob-
ability of a correct match, in a modeling framework that considers the entire set of
alternatives, attributes, and individuals, and can help central planners in designing
their policies. We describe the attribute space as a Voronoi tessellation and use
rigorous analysis and numerical simulations to describe the probability for correct
MODELLING ALLOCATION MATCH UNDER UNCERTAINTY 11
match in space as a function of the uncertainty, and to calculate the average per-
centage of matches. We find that the overall mismatch can be considerable even for
low levels of uncertainty, and thus can be a concern for policy makers. We further
explore a practice often used by central planner - allocating service representatives
to help individuals obtain the correct decisions. We use numerical simulations to
show that within a given budget, the allocation is most effective for individuals
whose preferences are at a certain distance from the boundaries of a Voronoi cell -
not too deep in the cell, but yet not too close to a boundary.
This paper suggests several avenues for future research. First, one could re-
examine our assumption on a uniform distribution of the population in the attribute
space. Other distributions, such as bell-shaped distribution around a central value
might diminish the impact of uncertainty (if, for example, there are several clusters
of individuals and a single alternative is placed in the middle of each cluster), or
alternatively enhance it (if preferences are centered around certain values, but the
alternatives are scattered in space). An additional extension could be exploring
the issue of capacity constraints - the scenario in which a mismatch could prevent
another individual from being correctly matched. A third topic of interest would
be endogenous sources of information, beside the reps, such as word-of-mouth from
other users. Since this additional information also has uncertainty, it can hypo-
thetically work in both directions and its influence on the reps allocation is not
trivial.
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Supplementary Figure 1. Voronoi tessellation. a. An ex-
ample for a two dimensional square [0, 1]2 of side length 1, where
6 alternatives (yellow) divide the area to distinct Voronoi cells. b.
In this example, ρ = 0.1. The probability Pρ(x) that an individual
x (marked by the black dot) chose the correct Voronoi cell is the
relative area of the part of the ball of radius ρ around x which lies
in the same Voronoi cell as x.
Supplementary Figure 2. Match probabilities. a. The lo-
cal probability for a match, Pρ(x), is plotted as a color map for
the example shown in Figure. 1. b. Average probability for a
match 〈Pρ〉 as a function of ρ for this configuration. Displayed is
a comparison between the small ρ linear approximation and the
numerical calculation. The probability for correct match rapidly
decreases with ρ and the decrease is attenuated for large values of
ρ, until saturation.
Appendix A. Proof of the formula for the first variation of the
expected probability of correct assignment
We start with a space of attributesA which is aK-dimensional box, A = [a1, b1]×
[a2, b2] × [aK , bK ] with side-lengths bi − ai. We are given partition of the space of
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Supplementary Figure 3. Effects of the distribution and
the number of alternatives on the probability for a match
a. −d 〈P (ρ = 0)〉 /dρ vs. the number of alternatives. For each
number of alternatives we generated 100 market configurations
sampled from a uniform distribution. For each configuration we
calculated the length of the boundaries between the resulting
Voronoi cells and used equation 5 to compute d 〈P (ρ = 0)〉 /dρ.
We present the average value of the different configurations. The
error bar shows the standard deviation. b. Dependence on the dis-
tribution of alternatives: −d 〈P (ρ = 0)〉 /dρ vs. σ, where σ is the
width of a trimmed Gaussian distribution, from which the location
of alternatives is sampled. The simulation procedure is similar to
panel (a). We vary σ for the case of 6 alternatives (panel b)
attributes A into Voronoi cells with disjoint interiors: A = ∐Jj=1Dj . The cells
are convex polytopes, so that the boundary of each cell is covered by finitely many
hyperplanes.
We fix an uncertainty factor, a ball of radius ρ > 0, and for a point x ∈ A we
ask what is the probability Pρ(x) that we assign the correct Voronoi cell, given this
uncertainty factor ρ? That is, given that x ∈ Dj , what is the probability that we
assign Dj as the basin of attraction, using an error bar of ρ? Note that the problem
only makes sense for small ρ, because once ρ is sufficiently large so that the ball
B(x, ρ) covers all of A, say ρ > ρmax, then the question is independent of ρ.
We can write a formula for the expected value 〈Pρ〉 of Pρ(x) (as we average over
x):
Proposition 1.
(7) 〈Pρ〉 = 1
volA
∑
j
∫
Dj
vol
(
Dj ∩B(x, ρ)
)
volB(x, ρ)
dx
where B(x, ρ) is the ball around x of radius ρ.
If ρ > ρmax, then 〈Pρ〉 saturates at 〈Pρ〉 =
∑J
j=1(volDj)
2/(volA)2.
Proof. To see (7), recall that given that x ∈ Dj , the probability Pρ(x) that we
select Dj as the basin of attraction is the relative area of the intersection of the
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Supplementary Figure 4. Improving match probabilities
using service reps a. Areas which maximize the effectiveness of
service reps (blue), within a budget b = 0.2, for ρl = 0.025 and
ρ = 0.15 b. Average probability for a match 〈Pρ〉 as a function of
the budget b, where ρl = 0.025 and ρ = 0.15. The orange line shows
a linear improvement when the reps are assigned randomly. The
blue dots show maximal improvement when the reps are allocated
optimally. c. The equivalent overall ρ which results in the same
〈Pρ〉 as an optimal allocation of reps within a given budget b.
ball of radius ρ with the cell Dj :
Pρ(x) =

vol(Dj∩B(x,ρ))
volB(x,ρ) , x ∈ Dj
0, x /∈ Dj .
We want to compute the expected value of Pρ(x) (we average over x):
〈Pρ〉 = 1
volA
∑
j
∫
Dj
Pρ(x)dx =
∑
j
1
volA
∫
Dj
vol
(
Dj ∩B(x, ρ)
)
volB(x, ρ)
dx.
To see the saturation value, take ρ to be larger than the diameter of the space
of attributes A, so that for each point x, the ball B(x, ρ) coincides with all of A.
Then for each x ∈ A, the intersection B(x, ρ)∩Dj = Dj , and we can compute 〈Pρ〉
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simply as a conditional expectation, by writing
Pρ(x) =
J∑
j=1
1Dj (x)
volDj
volA
and then
〈Pρ〉 =
∫
A Pρ(x)dx
volA =
1
volA
J∑
j=1
∫
A
1Dj (x)
volDj
volA dx =
J∑
j=1
(volDj
volA
)2
as claimed. 
A.1. The one dimensional case. Equation (7) makes sense in any dimension,
but it is only in dimension K = 1, when the space of attributes is an interval
A = [0, L], that we know how to extract an exact expression from it for small ρ.
Proposition 2. For K = 1, and ρ < 12 minj(aj+1 − aj),
〈Pρ〉 = 1− J − 1
2
ρ
lengthA .
Proof. We use equation (7): In this one-dimensional case, the Voronoi cells are
intervals Dj = [aj , aj+1], with 0 = a1 < a2 < · · · < aJ+1 = L. We assume that
2ρ < min
j
lengthDj = min
j
(aj+1 − aj).
To compute the contribution of each cell Dj = [aj , aj+1], divide the region of
integration into an interior region Dintj := [aj + ρ, aj+1 − ρ] and two boundary
regions [aj , aj + ρ] and [aj+1 − ρ, aj+1].
For x in the interior region, we have B(x, ρ) ⊂ Dj so that Dj ∩B(x, ρ) = B(x, ρ)
and hence∫
Dintj
length
(
Dj ∩B(x, ρ)
)
lengthB(x, ρ)
dx =
∫
Dintj
1dx = length(Dintj )
= (aj+1 − ρ)− (aj + ρ)
= aj+1 − aj − 2ρ = length(Dj)− 2ρ.
To compute the contribution of the boundary components, note that there are
two types, corresponding if they coincide with the boundary of the interval, namely
j = 1, J + 1, or not (j = 2, . . . , J).
For components which do not intersect the boundary, namely if j 6= 1, J+1 then
for all x ∈ [aj , aj +ρ]∪ [aj+1−ρ, aj+1], the “ball” B(x, ρ) = [x−ρ, x+ρ] has length
2ρ, but
B(x, ρ) ∩Dj = [x− ρ, x+ ρ] ∩ [aj , aj+1] =
{
[aj , x+ ρ], aj ≤ x ≤ aj + ρ
[x− ρ, aj+1], aj+1 − ρ ≤ x ≤ aj+1
(see Supplementary Figure 5) and
lengthB(x, ρ) ∩Dj =
{
x+ ρ− aj , aj ≤ x ≤ aj + ρ
aj+1 + ρ− x, aj+1 − ρ ≤ x ≤ aj+1
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Supplementary Figure 5. The overlap of the “balls” B(x, ρ) =
[x− ρ, x+ ρ] with the Voronoi intervals Dj = [aj , aj+1].
so that ∫ aj+ρ
aj
length
(
Dj ∩B(x, ρ)
)
lengthB(x, ρ)
dx =
∫ aj+ρ
aj
x+ ρ− aj
2ρ
dx =
3
4
ρ
and ∫ aj+1
aj+1−ρ
length
(
Dj ∩B(x, ρ)
)
lengthB(x, ρ)
dx =
∫ aj+1
aj+1−ρ
aj+1 + ρ− x
2ρ
dx =
3
4
ρ.
Altogether, we obtain for j 6= 1, J that∫
Dj
pρ(Dj)(x)dx = length(Dj)− 2ρ+ 3
4
ρ+
3
4
ρ = lengthDj − 1
2
ρ.
For components which do intersect the boundary, that is for D1 = [0, a2] or
DJ = [aJ , L], we have
B(x, ρ) = B(x, ρ) ∩D1 = [0, x+ ρ], x ∈ D1,
and
B(x, ρ) = B(x, ρ) ∩DJ = [x− ρ, L], x ∈ DJ
so that
lengthB(x, ρ) ∩Dj
lengthB(x, ρ)
= 1, x ∈ D1 ∪DJ
and we get a contribution of ∫ ρ
0
1dx = ρ =
∫ L
L−ρ
1dx.
Therefore,∫
Dj
Pρ(x)dx = lengthDj − 2ρ+ 3
4
ρ+ ρ = lengthDj − 1
4
ρ, j = 1, J.
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Altogether we find
〈Pρ〉 = 1
lengthA
J∑
j=1
∫
Dj
Pρ(x)dx
=
1
lengthA
(
lengthD1 − 1
4
ρ+
J−1∑
j=2
(
lengthDj − 1
2
ρ
)
+ lengthDJ − 1
4
ρ
)
=
1
lengthA
( J∑
j=1
lengthDj − J − 1
2
ρ
)
= 1− J − 1
2
ρ
lengthA
as claimed. 
A.2. Higher dimensions K ≥ 2. We now pass to the higher dimensional case
K ≥ 2. Our goal in this section is to obtain an exact formula for the first variation
of 〈Pρ〉, that is for the slope at ρ = 0.
For each Voronoi cell Dj , we denote by ∂
intDj the part of the boundary of Dj
which does not lie on the boundary of the box (the space of attributes) A.
Proposition 3. In dimension K ≥ 2, the mean probability for correct assignment
〈Pρ〉 for ρ small is
〈Pρ〉 ∼ 1−
 cK
volA
∑
j
volK−1(∂intDj)
 · ρ, ρ↘ 0
where
(8) cK =
1
2
Γ
(
K
2 + 1
)
√
piΓ
(
K+3
2
) =

1
pi
22m
(m+1)(2m+1m )
, K = 2m even
1
22m+2
(
2m+1
m
)
, K = 2m+ 1 odd.
Proof. We start by using equation (7)
(9) 〈Pρ〉 = 1
vol(A)
∑
j
∫
Dj
vol (B(x, ρ) ∩Dj)
volB(x, ρ)
dx .
There are two types of points x ∈ Dj : Type I, those x ∈ Dj so that the ball B(x, ρ)
is entirely contained in Dj , and type II are the rest (Supplementary Figure 6).
Note that if x is close to the boundary of A: dist(x, ∂A) < ρ, but far from the
interior boundary of the cell, that is dist(x, ∂intDj) > ρ, then B(x, ρ) ⊆ Dj is
entirely contained in the cell, even though it is only a truncated ball (Supplementary
Figure 7). This means that these points are type I. Thus type II points are precisely
those x ∈ Dj so that dist(x, ∂intDj) < ρ.
For type I points, we have B(x, ρ)∩Dj = B(x, ρ) so that the quotient of volumes
equals unity:
vol (B(x, ρ) ∩Dj)
volB(x, ρ)
= 1, x of type I.
Thus the type I points contribute
(10)
1
vol(A)
∑
j
∫
x∈Dj
x type I
vol (B(x, ρ) ∩Dj)
volB(x, ρ)
dx =
∑
j
vol{x ∈ Dj type I}
vol(A) .
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Supplementary Figure 6. Type I region, type II region
(shaded) and the excised points near the boundary (shaded region
with stripes).
The type II points are contained in a “strip” around the interior boundary of
“width” 2ρ. We excise the contribution of points which are also ρ-close to ∂A or
to more than one interior face (Supplementary Figure 6). The volume of these
points is bounded by O(ρ2), since they are at distance ≤ ρ from the intersec-
tion of two faces or the intersection of a face with ∂A, which has codimension 2.
Since vol (B(x, ρ) ∩Dj) /volB(x, ρ) ≤ 1 in any case, the total contribution of such
points is O(ρ2), which is negligible. Thus we need only consider points x with
dist(x, ∂intDj) < ρ and in addition that B(x, ρ) is an actual Euclidean ball, not a
truncated one.
Proposition 4. For ρ sufficiently small, the contribution of type II points is∑
j
vol(x ∈ Dj type II)
vol(A) −
cK volK−1 ∂intDj
vol(A) ρ+O(ρ
2).
Putting together equation (10) and Proposition 4 gives Proposition 3. 
A.3. Proof of Proposition 4. Fix a component H of the interior boundary
∂intDj ; H is a hyperplane. After rotation, reflection and translation of the dia-
gram, we may assume that the boundary component H is the coordinate hyperplane
H = {x = (x1, . . . xK) : xK = 0}, and that the cell Dj lies in the top half-space
H+ = {(y1, . . . , yK) : yK ≥ 0} (Supplementary Figure 7). Then for every x ∈ H+,
we have dist(x,H) = xK and we assume that 0 ≤ xK ≤ ρ. We need to compute∫
x:(x1,...,xK−1,0)∈H
vol (B(x, ρ) ∩Dj)
volB(x, ρ)
dx1 . . . dxK
=
1
volB(0, ρ)
∫
0≤xK≤ρ
(x1,...,xK−1,0)∈H
vol (B(x, ρ) ∩Dj) dx1 . . . dxK .
20 MODELLING ALLOCATION MATCH UNDER UNCERTAINTY
Supplementary Figure 7. A truncated ball
We fix the first K−1 components x0 = (x1, . . . , xK−1), and compute the integral
over xK :
Lemma 5. Fix (x1, . . . , xK−1) so that (x1, . . . , xK−1, 0) ∈ H. Then
1
volB(0, ρ)
∫ ρ
xK=0
vol
(
B
(
(x1, . . . , xK−1, xK) , ρ
)
∩H+
)
dxK
= 1− cK · ρ+O(ρ2).
Proof. Since the integral is independent of the first K − 1 components, those may
be taken to be zero, so that (x1, . . . , xK−1) = (0, . . . , 0). So we want to compute∫ ρ
xK=0
vol
(
B
(
(0, . . . , 0, xK) , ρ
)
∩H+
)
dxK .
The setB
(
(0, . . . , 0, xK) , ρ
)
∩H+ is the bigger half of the ballB
(
(0, . . . , 0, xK) , ρ
)
(see Supplementary Figure 7); we find it easier to compute the integral over the
complementary, smaller half, which is a spherical cap (Supplementary Figure 8),
and this in turns equals
Supplementary Figure 8. A spherical cap
∫ ρ
xK=0
vol
(
B
(
(0, . . . , 0, xK) , ρ
)
∩H+
)
dxK
= volB(0, ρ)−
∫ ρ
xK=0
vol
(
B
(
(0, . . . , 0,−xK) , ρ
)
∩H+
)
dxK .
Dividing by volB(0, ρ) gives
1− 1
volB(0, ρ)
∫ ρ
0
A(xK)dxK
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where A(xK) is the volume of the small spherical cap
A(xK) := vol
(
B
(
(0, . . . , 0,−xK) , ρ
)
∩H+
)
= vol{(~y, z) : ~y ∈ RK−1, z ≥ 0, |~y|2 + (z + xK)2 ≤ ρ2}
=
∫
~y∈RK−1
|~y|2≤ρ2−x2K
∫ −xK+√ρ2−|~y|2
z=0
dzd~y
=
∫
|~y|2≤ρ2−x2K
(√
ρ2 − |~y|2 − xK
)
dK−1~y
=
∫
|~y|2≤ρ2
1(|~y|2 + x2K ≤ ρ2)
(√
ρ2 − |~y|2 − xK
)
dK−1~y.
Now integrate over xK ∈ [0, ρ]: Switching order of integration gives∫ ρ
0
A(xK)dxK =
∫ ρ
0
∫
|~y|2≤ρ2
1(|~y|2 + x2K ≤ ρ2)
(√
ρ2 − |~y|2 − xK
)
dK−1~ydxK
=
∫
|~y|2≤ρ2
∫ ρ
xK=0
(√
ρ2 − |~y|2 − xK
)
1(|~y|2 + x2K ≤ ρ2)dxKdK−1~y
=
∫
|~y|2≤ρ2
∫ √ρ2−|~y|2
xK=0
(√
ρ2 − |~y|2 − xK
)
dxKd
K−1~y
=
∫
|~y|2≤ρ2
(ρ2 − |~y|2)dK−1~y −
∫
|~y|2≤ρ2
1
2
(ρ2 − |~y|2)dK−1~y
=
1
2
∫
|~y|2≤ρ2
(ρ2 − |~y|2)dK−1~y
= ρK+1
1
2
∫
|~y|≤1
(1− |~y|2)dK−1~y.
When K = 2, this equals
ρ3
1
2
∫ 1
y=−1
(1− y2)dy = 2
3
ρ3
and dividing by the area of B(0, ρ) = piρ2 gives
1
areaB(0, ρ)
∫ ρ
0
A(x2)dx2 =
2
3pi
ρ = c2ρ.
For K ≥ 3, we will use polar coordinates: In G ≥ 2 dimensions (we will take
both G = K − 1 and G = K)
xj = r cos(θj)
j−1∏
k=1
sin θk, j = 1, . . . , G− 1, xG = r
G−1∏
k=1
sin θk
with r ≥ 0, 0 ≤ θj ≤ pi for j = 1, . . . , G − 2 and 0 ≤ θG−1 ≤ 2pi. The Jacobian of
this transformation is
JG(r, θ) = r
G−1
G−2∏
j=1
(sin θj)
G−1−j .
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The volume of the ball B(0, ρ) ⊂ RK in dimension G = K is thus
volK B(0, ρ) =
∫ ρ
r=0
rK−1dr
K−2∏
j=1
∫ pi
θj=0
(sin θj)
K−1−jdθj
∫ 2pi
θK−1=0
dθK−1
= ρK
2pi
K
∫ pi
θ1=0
(sin θ1)
K−2dθ1 ·
K−2∏
j=2
∫ pi
0
(sin θj)
K−1−jdθj
=
2pi
K
∫ pi
θ1=0
(sin θ1)
K−2dθ1 ·
K−3∏
i=1
∫ pi
0
(sin θj)
K−2−idθi · ρK
=
2pi
K
√
piΓ
(
K−1
2
)
Γ
(
K
2
) · K−3∏
i=1
∫ pi
0
(sin θj)
K−2−idθi · ρK .
Using polar coordinates in RK−1, K ≥ 3 (so that G = K − 1), gives∫
|~y|≤1
(1− |~y|2)dK−1~y =
∫ 1
0
(1− r2)rK−2dr
K−3∏
j=1
∫ pi
0
(sin θj)
K−2−jdθj
∫ 2pi
0
dθK−2
=
2
K2 − 12pi
K−3∏
j=1
∫ pi
0
(sin θj)
K−2−jdθj
so that ∫ ρ
0
A(xK)dxK =
1
K2 − 12pi
K−3∏
j=1
∫ pi
0
(sin θj)
K−2−jdθj · ρK+1.
Dividing we find that
1
volB(0, ρ)
∫ ρ
0
A(xK)dxK =
K
K2 − 1
Γ
(
K
2
)
√
piΓ
(
K−1
2
) · ρ = Γ(K2 + 1)
2
√
piΓ(K+32 )
· ρ
which equals cKρ. 
We can now complete the proof of Proposition 4: Until now, we have fixed the co-
ordinates (x1, . . . , xK−1), where the particular face of the cell is (x1, . . . , xK−1, 0) ∈
H ∩Dj ; integrating over these coordinates, we obtain the (K − 1)-dimensional vol-
ume of that face up to an error of O(ρ2) , and summing over all interior faces of
the cell Dj and then over the various cells, we obtain
1
volA
∑
j
(
vol(x ∈ Dj : of type II)− volK−1(∂intDj)cKρ
)
+O(ρ2)
as asserted by Proposition 4. 
Appendix B. Distance Based Matching Metric
We explore the sensitivity of our results in Figure 2 of the main text to a matching
measure which is based on distance rather than a matching/non-matching binary
classification. One can say, that a binary match/non-match classification does
not provide information as to how much the chosen alternative is worse than the
optimal one, and thus it makes it harder to evaluate the overall dissatisfaction in
the population. A metric which measures the average distance between the possible
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chosen alternatives and the true location, might provide additional information as
to the level of satisfaction of the individual from the chosen alternative.
To construct such metric, consider an individual at location x, within a single
Voronoi cell Dj . If there is no uncertainty in the perceived location of that individ-
ual (ρ = 0),the individual is assigned to alternative j, at a distance d(ρ = 0, x) =
|x − j| to the alternative. If the individual mistakenly perceives his position as
y, leading to choosing another alternative, i, then the distance between the true
location and the chosen alternative is |x − i|. Assuming a uniformly distributed
error ball of radius ρ around x, we obtain the average distance between the chosen
alternative and the true position as:
(11) d (ρ, x) =
∑
j
vol
(
Dj ∩B(x, ρ)
)
volB(x, ρ)
|x− j|
Supplementary Figure 9a shows the effect of uncertainty on the average distance
to the chosen alternative: d (ρ, x) − d (ρ = 0, x). By integrating over the attribute
space we obtain the average distance between all of the individuals and their chosen
alternatives. To measure the elasticity of the overall match on the error ρ, we divide
the above average by the average distance obtained for ρ = 0:
(12) 〈d (ρ)〉 =
∫
d (ρ, x) dx∫
d (ρ = 0, x) dx
The metric 〈d (ρ)〉 represents the average incremental distance between the true
location and all the possible chosen alternatives within the error ball, relative to
the no error case. The larger is its deviation from 1, the higher is the distance
between the individuals and their chosen alternatives.
Supplementary Figure 9a visualizes the effect of uncertainty for the case of the
attribute space shown in Figures 1 and 2 of the main text. We plot d(ρ, x) −
d(ρ = 0, x) at each point of the attribute space. Just as in the case of the binary
metric, most of the effect of the uncertainty lies within a strip of radius ρ around
the boundaries. However, unlike the binary metric, where the boundaries are the
most sensitive to the occurrence of a mismatch, for the distance-based metric, the
boundaries are the regions which are the least sensitive to a mismatch, as the
distance to the alternatives on both sides of the boundary is of similar magnitude.
Supplementary Figure 9b shows 1/ 〈d (ρ)〉 vs. ρ for the same attribute space.
The value of 1/ 〈d (ρ)〉 decreases with ρ. Note, that unlike the linear decrease in
the binary metric, this decrease, for low values of ρ, can be fitted by a parabola
〈d (ρ)〉 ∝ ρ2. The effect of the uncertainty is thus second order in ρ.
To compare the effect of the uncertainty between the binary and the distance
based cases, consider ρ = 0.15. The mismatch probability in the binary case is 20%
(as shown in Figure 2 of the main text), however the value of 〈d(ρ)〉 is 1.03. That
is, although on average 20% of the population is expected to choose an alternative
which is not optimal, the distance to their chosen alternatives is expected to increase
by 3%.
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Supplementary Figure 9. Distance based matching. a.
The effect of the uncertainty on the average distance to the chosen
alternative: d(ρ, x) − d(ρ = 0, x) obtained using numerical simu-
lations for the example shown in Figure 1 of the main text and
ρ = 0.125 b. 1/ 〈d(ρ)〉 vs. ρ for the same example.
